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ABSTRACT 
This paper notes an intellectual transformation occurring in relatively obscure cases in the New 
Deal Court.  Among other things, these cases prefigure the advent of Carolene Products and the 
tiered scrutiny characteristic of modern rights-based constitutional litigation.  At a deeper level, 
these cases mark a revolution in constitutional analysis with resonance for our present structural 
understandings of national power, state power, and the workings of American federalism. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Carolene Products, with its Footnote Four,1 is surely one of the great 
revolutionary achievements of the New Deal Court.2  The case formal-
ized that part of the New Deal settlement which was the particular 
concern of the Roosevelt administration, and to which the Supreme 
 
*   Copyright © 2012, 2013 by Louise Weinberg.  Earlier drafts of this paper were presented 
at a symposium at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, January 20, 
2012; a faculty “Drawing Board Lunch” at the University of Texas School of Law, Austin, 
October 4, 2011; and at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference at Hil-
ton Head Island, July 24, 2011.  I am grateful to Craig Jackson and the University of Penn-
sylvania Journal of Constitutional Law. 
**  Holder of the Bates Chair and Professor of Law, the University of Texas School of Law.  I 
am building here on Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1631 (2005); Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1295 
(1997); Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 731 (1995); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:  “Actual” Conflicts, 
70 TEX. L. REV. 1743 (1992); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982). 
 1 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting the pro-
priety of heightened scrutiny of laws violating rights specifically enumerated or discrimi-
nating against discrete and insular minorities disadvantaged in the political process).  
Today, rather than referring to specifically enumerated rights, we might refer more gen-
erally to “fundamental rights”; and instead of focusing on discrete groups we might refer 
instead to “inherently suspect classifications.” 
 2 See, e.g., Nancy Staudt & Yilei He, The Macroeconomic Court:  Rhetoric and Implications of New 
Deal Decision-Making, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 87, 87 (2010) (“[T]he Hughes Court] an-
nounced a significant—some say revolutionary—new understanding of judicial re-
view . . . . This new view . . . virtually unleashed Congress and the President to regulate, 
and the Court all but guaranteed it would sanction economic policies and pro-
grams . . . .”). 
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Court had only just begun to accede3—a new judicial acquiescence in 
the will of Congress.  By extension, Carolene Products’ presumption of 
constitutionality would be afforded state as well as federal laws. 
This in itself was a political and prudential revolution.  Beyond 
this, with Footnote Four Carolene Products gave us, in essence, the 
method of constitutional analysis peculiarly associated with the rights-
based constitutional litigation of our time—tiered scrutiny.  And 
Footnote Four presciently recognized that the protections of the Bill 
of Rights would work as against the states as well as the nation.4  More 
fundamentally, Carolene Products was an example and an affirmation 
of a transformation in our understandings of governance—of the pow-
er of Congress, the power of the states, and of the workings of Ameri-
can federalism. 
I made mention just now of “constitutional analysis.”  By this I 
mean something different from “constitutional interpretation.”  Con-
stitutional interpretation focuses on the Constitution itself and its 
meaning for particular cases.  It seeks to determine whether a litigant 
has a substantive prima facie right to challenge as unconstitutional 
some government act or law.  The great academic debate in the af-
termath of Roe v. Wade5 between “interpretivists” and “non-
interpretivists”6 was about the legitimacy of rights not enumerated in 
the Constitution.  The larger debate has long been about the seri-
ousness with which to take constitutional text, given any established 
text’s linguistic, temporal, and imaginative limits.   
Constitutional analysis, on the other hand, as used here, focuses 
not on the Constitution and its meanings, but rather on the govern-
 
 3 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (sustaining a state minimum 
wage law for women and minors against a Lochner-like due process challenge:  “In each 
case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is dep-
rivation of freedom of contract. . . . But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organ-
ization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, 
safety, morals, and welfare of the people. . . . [R]egulation which is reasonable in relation 
to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process . . .”). 
 4 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.  Today except for the Third Amendment protec-
tion against having to quarter soldiers, the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by 
grand jury, and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases worth more 
than twenty dollars, the Bill of Rights is substantially “incorporated” into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 5 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 6 For some indication of the range of views, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Raoul Berger, Some Reflections on Interpre-
tivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1986); Martin H. Redish, Interpretivism and the Judicial Role 
in a Constitutional Democracy:  Seeking an Alternative to Originalism, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 525 (1996); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:  A Critique of Interpre-
tivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
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ment act or law under constitutional challenge.  It seeks to determine 
whether the challenged act or law is justifiable.  This sort of analysis is 
the subject not so much of academic debate as it is of litigation, and 
the litigated question, to begin with, has to do with the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny to be afforded the thing challenged. 
This paper deals with a transformation in constitutional analysis 
that preceded and led up to Carolene Products, a transformation argu-
ably wrought by the Supreme Court in the 1930s in certain unlikely 
cases.  Carolene Products, with its Footnote Four, was surely the begin-
ning of the end of pre-modern constitutional thought.  But it was also 
the end of the beginnings.  These beginnings are what concern us 
here. 
II.  EARLIER INTIMATIONS 
Particularly germane to our story was the early elevation of ration-
ality, that bright guerdon of the common law, to constitutional status 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  In the Su-
preme Court, the most prominent early example of the “substantive” 
use of due process to control unreasonable law—law that is arbitrary 
and irrational no matter what procedures might be employed in 
bringing it to bear—is probably Dred Scott.7  Dred Scott held, in perti-
nent part, that Congress could not, consistent with due process, strip 
a slaveowner of slave “property” brought with him to sojourn in a ter-
ritory of the United States, merely by designating that territory as free 
territory.  And Congress could not strip a slaveowner of liberty to travel 
into that territory with his “property.”8  Chief Justice Taney wrote: 
And an act of Congress, which deprives a citizen of the United States of 
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had 
committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the 
name of due process of law.9 
Although there was no majority for this rationale, this was the key ar-
gument in Dred Scott insofar as the case operated to strike down the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820, as it had stood at the time relevant to 
Scott’s sojourn in a free territory.10 
 
 7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 8 Id. at 450. 
 9 Id. 
 10 The Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (1820), had been effectively repealed sub-
sequent to Scott’s sojourn in territory north of the Missouri Compromise line, at least for 
Kansas and Nebraska Territories, with the Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277, § 32 
(1854), providing for voter choice between slave-state or free-state status in territories 
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In the bare-bones understanding of substantive due process seen 
in Dred Scott’s unadorned references to liberty and property, it does 
not seem to matter whether the deprivation is accompanied by, or is 
described as, a violation of some further more specific fundamental 
right.11  In contrast, today, when substantive due process protects “lib-
erty,” the expectation seems to be that a particular liberty will be 
identified.  Even in Chief Justice Taney’s reference to liberty, Dred 
Scott can be read to imply an unenumerated right to travel interstate 
without penalty or forfeiture.12  There is also an implicit dimension of 
equal protection in this.  The slaveowner is seen as deserving rights 
equal to the rights of those who travel into free territory without hav-
ing to suffer a forfeiture of property.  Justice Catron concurred in the 
Dred Scott judgment in part on this ground.13 
Today, claims of deprivation of liberty under the bare Due Process 
Clause—that is, without the further pleading of a violation of some 
more specific fundamental right—are likely to be perceived, at most, 
as a challenge to the minimum rationality of a law or an official act.14  
Often such claims are perceived instead as “procedural.”  It is axio-
matic that the most obvious and effectual check on arbitrary govern-
ance lies in regular proceedings in a court of law, upon notice and 
hearing—Magna Carta’s “law of the land.”15  But a characterization of 
 
north of the old Missouri Compromise line.  The predictable sequel was the little civil war 
in “Bleeding Kansas.”  See Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with 
Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 845, 878 (2011); Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 
1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 113 (2007); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword:  The Document and 
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 44 (2000). 
 11 Compare Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450 (finding, inter alia, a deprivation of slave property by 
mere action of federal territorial law), with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 
(1923) (finding a deprivation of liberty in a statute interfering, inter alia, with the right of 
parents to control the rearing of their young).  
 12 Today, the right to travel is properly located in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–03 (1999). 
 13 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 527 (Catron, J., concurring). 
 14 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 465, 503 (2005) (O’Connor J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Due Process Clause . . . already prohibits irrational government action.” (citing 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005))); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 500 (1965) (Harlan J., concurring) (“While the relevant inquiry may be aided by re-
sort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or 
any of their radiations.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in 
my opinion, on its own bottom.”); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause against “all 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints”). 
 15    See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783 
(1833) (“The [Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment] is but an enlargement of the 
language of magna carta, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittimus, nisi per legale judicium 
parium suorum, vel per legem terrae, neither will we pass upon him, or condemn him, but by 
the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.  Lord Coke says, that these lat-
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law as “procedural” invites inquiry into the adequacy of pre-
deprivation notice and hearing,16 or of some post-deprivation remedy, 
the existence of which can bar a constitutional claim.17   
Claims of deprivation of property are also commonly perceived as 
“procedural,” and it may be argued in bar that adequate notice and 
hearing were furnished before the deprivation, or that some ade-
quate remedy was available afterward, if not now.18   
These are basic understandings that inform our interpretation of 
the protections afforded by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
Constitutional analysis, on the other hand, involves a direct appeal 
to reason rather than to preexisting understandings.  The reasoning 
involved can be quite powerful.  When reason is brought to bear up-
on a question of the constitutionality of some law, it becomes evident 
that law can govern only those people, things, or events within the 
scope of its purposes.  For this reason, purposive reasoning and ra-
tionality in law go hand in hand.  In McCulloch v. Maryland,19 Chief 
Justice Marshall spelled this out as a connection between means and 
ends, in line with the thinking of Alexander Hamilton.20  Marshall 
explained that Congress has intrinsic authority, within extrinsic con-
 
ter words, per legem terrae (by the law of the land) mean by due process of law . . . .” (refer-
ring to 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 50 (1642))).  There Coke 
refers to an act of Parliament, 37 E. 3. cap. 8, as equating “the law of the land” with “due 
process of law.” 
 16 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (sustaining a bare due process 
claim of deprivation of liberty where the plaintiff was committed to an institution without 
an adequate pre-deprivation hearing). 
 17 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that a comprehensive administrative 
remedial scheme bars a First Amendment claim by a federal employee); Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that the availability of a remedy under state libel law bars a civil 
rights claim against local officials for posting “mug shot” notices describing the plaintiff 
as an “active shoplifter”). 
 18 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]n 
challenging a property deprivation, the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies 
guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate. . . . When 
adequate remedies are provided and followed, no . . . deprivation of property without 
due process can result.”). 
 19 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 20 Alexander Hamilton, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (1791), 
in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 100–01 (Harold Coffin Syrett ed., 1965) (“[I]t 
is incident to a general sovereign or legislative power to regulate a thing, to employ all 
the means which relate to its regulation to the best and greatest advantage.”); THE 
FEDERALIST Nos. 19, 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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stitutional limits, to employ all means needful to achieve the legiti-
mate ends of government.21 
We see this matching up of means with ends today in the judicial 
distrust of laws or programs seen to be “overbroad” or too “sweep-
ing.”22  Overbroad law, sweeping too much into its orbit, can penalize 
or restrain innocent conduct.  On the other hand, a law or program 
might be held “underinclusive.”23  A law that does not cover all the 
cases within the scope of its apparent purposes suggests that it is pre-
textual, possibly discriminatory, targeted against a specific class of 
persons for no legitimate reason.  In other words, law must be “nar-
rowly tailored”;24 it must be “proportional” and “congruent” to a viola-
tion of clearly established law, fashioned to fit the pattern of known 
violations.25  For similar reasons, a challenged law is sometimes held 
to be overly restrictive in the face of less restrictive alternatives that 
can accomplish the law’s purposes.   
Although narrow tailoring is associated with strict scrutiny,26 it 
would seem that lawyers will necessarily raise actual mismatches of 
means to ends in attacking the asserted rational bases of law.  The re-
sponse to such an attack has sometimes been to point out that, since 
the law in question does have “some rational basis,” inquiry should be 
at an end.27  But this disregardful quality of extreme minimal scrutiny 
renders it unpersuasive.  The broad tendency has been for rational-
basis scrutiny to have considerable “bite.”28 
 
 21 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the con-
stitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”). 
 22 For a prominent example, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act on grounds of overbreadth). 
 23 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (striking down an ordinance pro-
hibiting cross burning in part on the ground that the ordinance did not protect all vic-
tims of hate speech, but only those on a list). 
 24 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (noting that “[t]he free exercise inquiry 
asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central 
religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies 
the burden”). 
 25 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”); id. at 531 (fail-
ing to find “some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country”). 
 26 Id. at 546–47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 27 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law 
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.  It is 
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
 28 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972) (coining this usage). 
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Purposive reasoning also necessarily implies an uncomplicated, 
bare due process right to non-arbitrary law.  A law or official act that 
is purposeless is arbitrary and irrational, and cannot be due process.29 
Challenges to arbitrary enforcements of law are challenges to official 
action, and thus can sound in equal protection.  But these can also be 
dealt with as a matter of due process; law that is discriminatory is not 
due process.30 
Arbitrary choices or applications of law can seem to be abstracted 
from the substantive content of the law to be chosen or applied,31 and 
thus off the merits.  Moreover, choices and applications of law are 
part of the judicial function.  For these reasons, the choosing of law, 
although outcome determinative, can be characterized as “procedur-
al” as well as substantive, much as statutes of limitation, for example, 
are characterized either way.32 
The choosing of law joins other off-merits “procedural” concerns 
in another strand of relevant prehistory.  One of the earliest if not the 
highest uses of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of 1868 was Pennoyer v. Neff,33 in which the Supreme Court lim-
ited a state court’s power to assert personal jurisdiction extraterritori-
ally.  The idea that it cannot be due process for a state without 
physical contact with a defendant to adjudicate that defendant’s case 
is not without resonance for the substantive freedom of travel with 
which Dred Scott’s Fifth Amendment due process was enmeshed.34  
The problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction also has resonance for 
the “dormant” Commerce Clause, the concept which, since Gibbons v. 
 
 29 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to the sub-
stantive protection provided by the Due Process Clause against all “arbitrary impositions 
and purposeless restraints”). 
 30 Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (striking down de jure segregation in 
Washington, D.C. under an anti-discrimination principle implicit in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).  Bolling can be read as a reverse-incorporation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. 
 31 But see generally, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of 
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924) (advancing the legal-realist argument that choices of law, if 
rational, are not simply procedural, but depend upon the substantive merits of the re-
spective laws as applied in the particular case, and therefore that choices of law cannot be 
neutral, uniform, or predictable). 
 32 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (permitting the forum to apply its own 
limitations period because the limitation of actions is traditionally considered “procedur-
al” and therefore within the province of the forum). 
 33 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 34 See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
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Ogden,35 has limited state power to affect the commerce of sister 
states. 
In this paper, we will be looking at a different aspect of the prob-
lem of territorial overreach that troubled the Court in Pennoyer v. 
Neff.  Territorial overreach obviously can occur not only when a state 
asserts jurisdiction to adjudicate, but also when it asserts jurisdiction 
to govern by its laws—its legislative jurisdiction.36  As one writer has 
quipped, the salient question for a person in fear of being hanged is 
not so much where, as whether.37  The immediate pre-history of modern 
constitutional analysis has to do with this latter question of territorial-
ly overreaching governance. 
A related strand of constitutional prehistory emerges in the ante-
bellum period, and increasingly preoccupies the Court, reaching its 
apogee in the Gilded Age struggle over the regulation of enterprise.  
A main effort of the Court throughout was to define the nature of 
regulatory power.  As part of this effort, the Court also sought to dis-
tinguish state from federal power.  These powers, until the 1930s, 
were thought to have been set down on lists.  State regulatory authori-
ty could be found on a list developed in case law, a list of powers en-
compassed within the “police power” of a state.  In the Supreme 
Court, the “police power” appears as early as Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Cohens v. Virginia,38 referring to the “internal police” of a 
city.  It appears importantly in New York v. Miln,39 as the Court sought 
to mark the imagined line between the commerce power of the na-
tion and the police power of the state.40  The police power figures im-
portantly also in Justice Miller’s disastrous opinion in The Slaughter-
house Cases.41  By the turn of the twentieth century the police power 
 
 35 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 36 For a current holding rejecting extraterritorial United States governance in transnational 
federal litigation, see Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (holding, 
in a case against American as well as foreign defendants, that the Securities and Exchange 
Act, and the federal common-law action under Rule 10b-5 for fraud in the purchase and 
sale of securities, do not apply to extraterritorial transactions on foreign exchanges). 
 37 Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner:  The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978) 
(“To believe that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state should be stronger under 
the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that 
an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.”). 
 38 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 444 (1821). 
 39 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 131 (1837). 
 40 See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). 
 41 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873) (stripping, in effect, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of content by holding that that clause protects only the 
rights of national citizenship, rights already protected against state abridgment in large 
part by the Supremacy Clause, and that these rights did not include the Bill of Rights, ex-
cept for a limited right to assemble).  Yet the Privileges and Immunities Clause was the 
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was a familiar list of approved areas of state authority, including the 
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of persons within a state’s 
borders.42  These were matters courts still speak of as “traditionally” 
for the states.43  But it was also held that the states were powerless to 
act upon matters not included in the customary list.44 
The notion that the authority of a state to govern could be found 
on a list of “police powers” may have received some impetus from the 
analogous constitutional doctrine of enumerated powers,45 the con-
viction that the power of the United States is strictly confined to the 
powers of the respective branches of government as specifically enu-
merated in the Constitution.  In the decades surrounding the turn of 
the last century, Congress was not infrequently held to have exceeded 
its delegated powers.  But because the states could be held as power-
less to legislate within the Constitution’s explicit delegations to Con-
gress as Congress was to legislate beyond them,46 whole swathes of the 
 
natural repository of the fundamental rights of individuals against local government.  In 
consequence, the Supreme Court over time has had to lodge substantive fundamental but 
unenumerated rights in the Due Process Clauses, notwithstanding the literally “proce-
dural” character of due process.  The Court treats such rights as components of the “lib-
erty” the Due Process Clauses acknowledge. 
 42 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173 (1908) (“There are, however, certain 
powers existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed 
‘police powers,’ the exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by 
the courts.  Those powers, broadly stated, and without, at present, any attempt at a more 
specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the pub-
lic.”). 
 43 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2623 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Congress [is] unable to regulate non-economic conduct that has only an at-
tenuated effect on interstate commerce and is traditionally left to state law.” (citing Unit-
ed States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
567 (1995))). 
 44 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–57, 64 (1905) (striking down a maximum ten-
hour day for bakers on the ground that the law was not a health law, which would have 
been within the state’s police power, but a labor law, which was not).  The earlier view was 
that until Congress chooses to act, the state retains power.  Cf. The License Cases, 46 U.S. 
(5 How.) 504, 586 (1847) (stating that, in the silence of Congress, a state retains power to 
enact its own laws within its own territory “according to the policy which the State may 
suppose to be its interest or duty to pursue”). 
 45 Accord Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1389 (2010).  For the view that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides 
clearer thinking about federal jurisdiction than the enumerations in Article III, see gen-
erally Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box:  The Power of “Congress” to Attack the “Jurisdiction” 
of “Federal Courts,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405 (2000). 
 46 Even in the absence of any significant conflict with federal law, even when the power of 
Congress is implied rather than express, state voices may be silenced completely via the 
doctrine of “complete preemption,” also termed “field preemption.”  See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. 
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (holding that a federal common law of admiralty, although 
there was no such law for the case, preempts state law); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (Harlan, J.) (holding, inter alia, that the foreign re-
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national economy could fall between the cracks, leaving large areas of 
interstate commerce in constitutional limbo, unregulable altogeth-
er.47  Worse, the enumerated lists did not work very well when it came 
to supplying answers to questions about governance.  The commerce 
power, still the focus of so much litigation, is enumerated.  Its consti-
tutional existence simply poses the problem.  Categorical reasoning, 
so seemingly sound, by a perverse alchemy was transmuting power in-
to powerlessness, and governance into lawlessness.  To be sure, the 
antithesis of this anomaly, unbounded government power, would 
have been at least as condign.48 
Perhaps to guard against the anomaly of matters beyond the regu-
latory reach of either state or nation, there has long existed a related 
but conveniently flexible doctrine of inherent power.49  The attraction 
of inherent power is its pragmatic capitulation to the reality that 
sometimes governance is necessary.  Since the power of governing 
must sometimes be exercised beyond existing enumerations, it is use-
ful to hold it implied—when possible, from analogous sources.50  
Even had American federalism not presented as difficult a task of 
line-drawing as it had, it would have been impractical to confine gov-
 
lations law of the United States even preempts the application of non-conflicting state 
law; and observing that “our conclusions might well be the same whether we dealt with 
this problem as one of state law or federal law.  However, we are constrained to make it 
clear that an issue concerned with . . . ordering our relationships with other members of 
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”). 
 47 In 1905, in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53–57, the Court struck down a state law regulating the 
conditions of labor for local bakers on the ground that the regulation of labor was not 
within the police power of a state, since such regulation would interfere with the liberty of 
contract; yet in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the Court also held that Con-
gress lacked power to regulate the interstate shipment of products of child and female la-
bor. 
 48 Fearing unbounded government power, the Court struck down much of the early New 
Deal, unfortunately throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  Cf. A. L. A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down provisions of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”)).  This legislation and the regulatory codes 
thereunder undoubtedly were overreaching and intrusive, but also included salutary wage 
and hours provisions. 
 49 Cf., e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423–27 (holding the foreign relations of the United States 
to be “inherently, “uniquely,” and “traditionally” federal); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 
46, 89 (1907) (discussing the inherent power of a state). 
 50 See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423–27 (implying federal judicial lawmaking power from 
the “constitutional underpinnings” of the national power over foreign relations; and fash-
ioning a federal-common law “act of state” defense); Jensen, 244 U.S. at 212, 214–15, 216–
17 (implying lawmaking power in Congress from the Article III grant of judicial power 
over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; implying federal judicial common-
law power from the same jurisdictional grant and from the implied power of Congress; 
and preempting the entire field for national governance). 
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ernance, federal or state, to predetermined lists.  Inherent power, 
then, is a useful escape from the tyranny of enumeration.   
There were others.  If the enterprise to be regulated was “affected 
with a public interest,” the regulation might be sustained.51  This cat-
egory of “affectation with a public interest” collapsed in the Nebbia 
case in 193452 with the belated recognition that all lawmaking is about 
matters affected with a public interest.  Nevertheless, “the public in-
terest,” at that time simply an abandoned escape route, was in actuali-
ty, as we shall see, a lighted path to the future. 
In the 1930s there was another very similar escape route in the air, 
of much earlier vintage, but even more influential than “affectation 
with a public interest.”  I refer to the notion that a state’s own “public 
policy” should prevail over another state’s otherwise applicable law.53  
This concept of a public policy exception to otherwise applicable law 
had first emerged conspicuously in the antebellum period.  Antebel-
lum northern judges increasingly refused to recognize southern 
“property” rights in slaves, and instead applied their own state’s pub-
lic policy, often on the theory that sojourning on free land made a 
man free.54  Southern judges, on the same theory, might also give “so-
journers” the benefit of a rule of liberty—the doctrine of “Once free 
and always free.”55  But in the late antebellum period, southern judges 
seeking to protect the South’s peculiar institution of slavery, began to 
refuse, on grounds of public policy, to free a slave under the other-
 
 51 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).  On the demise of the “affected with a public 
interest” doctrine, see generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  
THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 66–83 (1998), and HOWARD 
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:  THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE 
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 54–55, 150–51, 175–76 (1993). 
 52 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (holding that a state may regulate the price of 
milk without interference from the courts). 
 53 See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) (providing 
explicit public policy exceptions to its otherwise rigid choice rules throughout). 
 54 See, e.g., Case of Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1334, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1839) (No. 17709) (attempting 
to weigh the claims of humanity as against the rights of property; ultimately ruling against 
rendition of an alleged fugitive slave); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 564, 615, 632 
(1860) (extending, on public policy grounds, the rule freeing “sojourners” in a free state 
to slaves merely in transit there). 
 55 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 560 (1856) (McLean, J., dissent-
ing) (“In . . . Spencer v. Negro Dennis . . . the court say:  ‘Once free, and always free, is the 
maxim of Maryland law upon the subject . . . .’” (internal citations omitted)); Griffith v. 
Fanny, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 143 (1820) (holding that removal of a slave to a free state with the 
consent of the master frees the slave); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 479 
(1820) (same).  See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:  SLAVERY, 
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:  ANTI-SLAVERY AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery 
Cases; or, Night-Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316, 1337–42 (1997). 
302 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
wise applicable law of a free state.  The most famous judicial rejection 
of applicable free-state law on the grounds of public policy was the 
Missouri high court’s volte face in the first Dred Scott litigation.  There, 
the court below, applying the liberating laws of the free state of Illi-
nois and of the free United States territory in which Scott had “so-
journed,” held Scott to be a free man.56  But Missouri’s high court, 
unexpectedly overturning its own precedents, reversed, darkly warn-
ing that “a fell spirit” was overtaking the northern states, and con-
cluding that, in the circumstances, it would be best for Missouri to go 
its own way.57 
In the 1930s, these several strands of intellectual prehistory would 
meet, clash, and resolve in a handful of workaday cases in the Su-
preme Court of the United States.  These unnoticed cases quietly in-
troduced a kind of thinking that the Court would eventually embrace 
on a grand scale—the mode of constitutional analysis that can be 
seen crystallizing in Carolene Products and Footnote Four.  In a related 
development in the same period, constraints on the power of Con-
gress, thought to be implicit in the limits of Article I, would be sub-
stantially modified by a return to an understanding of government 
authority more in line with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, with its Hamiltonian framework of necessary and 
proper “means” to legitimate “ends.”58  The chief actors in this drama 
were Justice Brandeis and Justice [not yet Chief Justice] Stone.  We 
cannot say that these men were conscious of the intellectual frame-
work they were building.  But once the structural components are 
made plain, the modernist edifice built upon them takes on a charac-
ter of strength. 
To the extent that we can say anything that is fairly general, 
roughly true, and somewhat useful about the emergence of Carolene 
Products and of modernized constitutional analysis, it has its unlikely 
beginnings mostly in the 1930s, in the Hughes Court, in a few quotid-
ian judicial opinions in a very different field.  These key cases, all but 
 
 56 Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 586 (1852) (reversing the trial court, which had followed 
the rule of liberty, “Once free, always free”). 
 57 Id.  (“Times are not now as they were when the former decisions on this subject were 
made.  Since then not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and fell 
spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose 
inevitable consequences must be the overthrow and destruction of our government.  Un-
der such circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least coun-
tenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit.”).   
 58 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
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unknown to constitutional generalists today,59 were in the field of the 
conflict of laws. 
In an early article, having glimpsed the connection, I thought to 
explain the Court’s modern choice-of-law cases by attempting to as-
similate them to what I presumed was preexisting constitutional theo-
ry.60  I would have been closer to the mark had I attempted to assimi-
late the Court’s modern constitutional cases to preexisting choice-of-
law theory. 
III.  A FIRE IN MEXICO 
In the 1930 case of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,61 the Supreme Court 
held that Texas could not constitutionally expand the liability of out-
of-state reinsurers on an out-of-state insurance policy.  The result was 
unsurprising, quite in line with the Court’s existing jurisprudence.  
Similar quotidian cases had already gone the same way, on seemingly 
similar thinking.62  The opinion of the Court in Dick was unanimous—
 
 59 Sanford Levinson commented on the initial draft of this paper that I might be “on to 
something extremely interesting and important,” remarking that constitutional “mavens” 
do not read the conflicts cases.  Email from Sanford Levinson to author (Sept. 27, 2011, 
9:59 PM) (by permission).  The “unlikely” role of the conflicts cases in the intellectual 
history of constitutional law, much less conflicts law, is underscored by the fact that I have 
not been able to find among the prominent current biographies of Justice Brandeis, the 
author of the foundational case, see infra Part III, one that mentions that case, although 
the case is, at a minimum, the wellspring of modern constitutional control of state choic-
es of law.  See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS:  A LIFE (2009) (making no 
mention of the case); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION:  ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) (same); PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS:  BEYOND 
PROGRESSIVISM (1993) (same).  All are excellent works. 
 60 Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982). 
 61 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
 62 Cf. Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1925) (reversing judgment 
for the insured; holding that “full faith and credit” requires the forum to subordinate its 
law and policy, regardless of its contacts with a case, to the law of the place chartering the 
insurer); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922) (holding that “the 
Constitution and the first principles of legal thinking” allow the law of the place of con-
tracting to govern the validity and consequences of contracts, but that the place of con-
tracting was really the forum state); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376–77 
(1918) (holding, on the authority of the Head case, infra, that the forum could not consti-
tutionally impair the rights of an out-of-state creditor on an out-of-state contract, notwith-
standing that, as a result, a policy of insurance would be forfeited, contrary to forum state 
law); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161–62 (1914) (holding the same, under 
the Due Process Clause and its protection for the liberty of contract); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 593 (1897) (holding under the Due Process Clause that a state 
may not interfere with the liberty of a sister-state contract).  See generally E. Merrick Dodd, 
Jr., The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 
HARV. L. REV. 533 (1926). 
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apparently a foregone conclusion.  But the case could also be read as 
following a line of unattractive authority under the Due Process 
Clause.  In Dick, just as in Dred Scott, progressive law was held to have 
arbitrarily deprived persons of property.  At least two earlier cases, 
long before Lochner,63 had even viewed progressive economic regula-
tions as deprivations of liberty—the Lochnerian “liberty of contract.”64  
Yet, notwithstanding the awfulness of a provenance that combined 
Dred Scott with Lochner, experts in the field of conflict of laws com-
monly consider the Dick case the foundation of modern choice-of-law 
method.65 
Dick arose when a boat burned in Mexico.  By the way, this may be 
the only hard fact in the case.  By the time Dick reached the Supreme 
Court, the facts as stated in Justice Brandeis’s opinion were substan-
tially, well, notional.66  But the important thing is what Justice Brande-
is thought he was deciding. 
The facts as the Supreme Court saw them were these:  The owner 
of the boat, a tug, was a Mexican company.  The Mexican company 
had insured against the risk of fire, purchasing the policy in Mexico 
from a Mexican insurer.  After the tug burned, the company failed to 
notify the insurer of its claim on the policy within the time allowed.  
Under both the Mexican insurance policy and Mexican law, the time 
allowed was one year.  The Mexican insurer therefore refused to pay.  
The Mexican company thereupon assigned its claim to its employee, 
C. J. Dick, who hailed from Texas.  Dick could file suit, naturally 
enough, at home in Texas.  And under Texas law, Dick’s suit was 
 
 63 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–57, 64 (1905) (striking down a maximum ten-hour 
day sixty-hour week for bakers as an interference with the “liberty of contract” of both 
employer and employee protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 64 See, e.g., Head, 234 U.S. at 161 (describing this liberty as “freedom of contract”); Allgeyer, 
165 U.S. at 589 (“[T]he term [liberty] is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen . . . to 
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for 
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to 
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.”). 
 65 For current examples, see Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1531, 1554 & n.174 (2011); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State 
Power:  Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1057, 1076 (2009); Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (2005).  For the early influential broad reading of the case, see 
Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:  Governmental Interests and the Judi-
cial Function, in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 211–
14 (1963). 
 66 See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Who Was Dick?  Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law, 
1998 UTAH L. REV. 37 (1998).  I suspect that entropy of this sort, a familiar phenomenon 
in information theory, dogs a good many cases as they deteriorate their way up the appel-
late ladder.   
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timely.  Texas law gave insureds a two-year window in which to make a 
notice of claim on a policy, anything in the policy to the contrary 
notwithstanding.   
In Texas, service of process could not be had against the Mexican 
insurer, but Dick proceeded against two New York reinsurers instead, 
creatively garnishing a “debt” the reinsurers would owe the insurance 
company should Dick prevail in his suit.  Readers might reasonably 
conclude from these “facts”67 that the Mexican company was funding 
Dick’s litigation, and that it had made a sham assignment of its claim 
to Dick, its employee, precisely because it had been unable to make 
the insurer pay up in Mexico, and was hoping it could prevail, 
through Dick, under Texas law, in a Texas court. 
None of this is true, but even as the Justices saw the case, it must 
have seemed a lawsuit on stilts.  Neither party before the Court was 
the real party in interest, and neither party had any relevant connec-
tion with Texas.  The defendant garnishees had no connection with 
the state in which they were sued.  And even the Texan, Dick, was 
seen by the Court as residing at all relevant times in Mexico.  Fur-
thermore, neither the tug nor the fire, nor, for that matter, the poli-
cy, had any connection with Texas.   
The Texas courts had seen the case in a very different light.  They 
had all come to the aid of their domiciliary, C. J. Dick.68  As required 
by Texas law, the Texas courts had applied Texas law to trump the 
time limit in the foreign insurance policy.  After all, a Texas resident 
filing a notice of claim on a policy of insurance within two years was 
within the class the Texas legislation was intended to protect from 
more restrictive provisions in insurance policies, anything in those 
policies to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The United States Supreme Court, by Justice Brandeis, reversed 
this judgment, ruling in favor of the reinsurers.  Summoning up the 
 
 67 See Rensberger, Who Was Dick?, supra note 66, at 68–72.  Rensberger points out that at all 
relevant times Dick was a bona fide resident of Texas.  See also Transcript of Record at 26–
27, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (No. 232).  Furthermore, according to Professor 
Rensberger, the boat was a launch, not a tug, and Dick was its legal owner, not an assign-
ee.  Dick’s title was subject to the interests of a pair of intervenors—and also of the seller 
of the vessel, who was demanding the balance of the purchase price.  There was another 
unpaid creditor who had installed an engine.  I note a whiff of possible arson in the case.  
One senses in the record a growing financial desperation on Dick’s part.  See Transcript 
of Record, supra, at 12–14. 
 68 The Texas trial court put some meat on the bones of the case, appointing a lawyer for the 
absent insurer, and permitting the absentee to implead the reinsurers.  Rensberger, Who 
Was Dick?, supra note 66.  Judgment against the garnishees was affirmed by a Texas inter-
mediate appellate court, 8 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), and by the state’s supreme 
court, 15 S.W.2d 1028 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929). 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court de-
clared unconstitutional Texas’s enforcement of its own law in its own 
courts.69  Had the Texas court violated the Due Process Clause, as ex-
pounded in Lochner?  That is, had the Texas court interfered with the 
liberty of contract?  This was the central federal question raised in the 
brief for the garnishees in the United States Supreme Court.70  The 
garnishees did not cite Lochner itself, however.  And although Dick was 
a due process case, it does not rely on Lochner.  These facts seemingly 
support Barry Cushman’s view that Lochner was a fading memory by 
the early 1930s.71  But Lochnerism was not. 
Nor was the result a matter of full faith and credit to the laws of 
the place of contracting, a theory that had seduced the Court on a 
previous occasion.72  The Full Faith and Credit Clause and its imple-
menting statute, properly understood, apply only to judgments, not 
laws.73  And they apply only to state judgments.  They have no applica-
tion to foreign law. 
The Supreme Court did not strike down the Texas law, nor did it 
validate the restrictive time limit in the insurance policy, nor did it 
require deference to Mexican law.  Rather, the Court struck down the 
Texas trial court’s garnishment of the contingent debt owed to the 
insurer by the New York reinsurers.74  Yet this was not, strictly speak-
ing, a ruling about jurisdiction.  Justice Brandeis reasoned, rather, 
that the supposed “debt” of the reinsurers had been garnished on the 
basis of an expansion of liability (an expansion of a year beyond the 
year contracted for), thus depriving the garnishees of property with-
out due process of law.75 
Stated baldly in this way, the holding may strike you as nonsense.  
Of course Texas has authority, as an original matter, to expand the 
liability of out-of-state reinsurers.  That is the sort of thing laws pro-
tective of home folks do.  And of course Texas had authority to try 
the case against the reinsurers on the assumption that there was a 
 
 69 Dick, 281 U.S. at 407–08. 
 70 Brief for Appellant and Petition for Certiorari, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 
(1930) (No. 232); Rensberger, Who Was Dick?, supra note 66, at 64. 
 71 See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881, 983 & 
n.562 (2005) (arguing that by the close of the 1930s, Lochner was not being cited even in 
Lochner-sorts of cases). 
 72 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1918). 
 73 Cf. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Act of 1790, today codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738.  See infra notes 
119–20 and accompanying text. 
 74 Dick, 281 U.S. at 410. 
 75 Id. at 407. 
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debt in Texas to be garnished.  But in the Supreme Court’s view, 
Texas, though the home state of the beneficiary’s assignee, with pre-
sumed quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendants, nevertheless had 
nothing to do with the case.  In the Court’s view, it was the choice of 
Texas law that had been arbitrary and unreasonable.  This was not 
because Texas law expanded the liability of the reinsurers beyond 
what they had undertaken in a sacrosanct contract.76  Rather, Texas 
law had expanded their liability for no reason. 
That a state court could not constitutionally apply its own law in a 
case like Dick is hardly self-evident today.  All state judges are sworn to 
uphold and enforce “their own” constitutions and laws, subject of 
course to the laws and Constitution of the United States.  Under clas-
sic conflicts rules, notice-of-claim statutes, like statutes of limitation, 
are “procedural” in the sense that they are unconnected to the merits 
of a case, and the forum may always apply its own procedural law, in-
cluding its own time limits.77  To the extent that a purpose of limita-
tion of actions is to bar stale claims, the forum may always apply its 
own period of limitations at least to bar a claim.78  Even in applying a 
longer period of limitations to open the door to an otherwise expired 
claim, Texas had conformed to practices not uncommon even in our 
time, when it applied law duly enacted by its own legislature to effec-
tuate quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a defendant debtor, at the instance 
of its own citizen, on the basis of alleged property in the state.  
Recognition of the protective power of the state vis-à-vis its residents, 
even those whose residence is acquired after the transaction or oc-
currence under litigation, is quite in line (contrary to the Court’s po-
 
 76 Id. at 411.  For Lochner-like such cases before and after Lochner, see infra note 92. 
 77 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1988) (holding that the forum may always 
apply its own period of limitations because the choice of forum law on that issue is tradi-
tional); Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990) (holding that a transferred 
federal case retains the limitations period of the shopped-for transferor forum, even 
when the transfer is on the plaintiff’s motion). 
 78 A similar concern about stale claims is seen in notice-of-claim statutes such as the statute 
in question in Dick.  These function in part to ensure that witnesses’ recollections are 
fresh.  This purpose is not well served by opening the forum with a longer period of limi-
tations to a claim barred at the plaintiff’s residence or at the place of transaction or oc-
currence.  Nevertheless the Supreme Court has supported a plaintiff’s shopping for a 
long statute of limitations at a forum without connection with a case beyond its jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.  See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 531–32; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1988).  A successful floor amendment to § 142 offered by the 
author made an “exceptional circumstances” loophole in this Section available to the fo-
rum seeking to apply its own longer statute as well as the forum seeking to apply a sister 
state’s longer statute.  See Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law:  The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 683, 705–06 & n.135 (1991). 
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sition in Dick), with the 1981 case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.79  
Hague is good authority, although it will always annoy some writers.  
The Hague Court sustained a choice of the law of the after-acquired 
residence of the plaintiff, and imposed liability upon an out-of-state 
insurer who was relying on the law of the state where all relevant 
events had occurred, and which had been, at the time of the events in 
suit, the joint residence of the parties. 
Worse, justice did not necessarily triumph in Dick.80  Had anything 
in this action been able to bind the insurers, the Court might have 
been said to have bestowed a windfall on the reinsurers.  The Court’s 
holding, in effect, validated—in a contract of adhesion, as between 
parties of unequal bargaining power—a boilerplate clause that was 
illegal at the forum, where the forum was the assignee’s home state.  
The law in question was reasonable public policy,81 and the resident 
assignee was within the scope of the law’s protections. 
Indeed, we might find Justice Brandeis’s authorship of Dick sur-
prising in any event, from a political point of view.82  Brandeis was 
“the people’s lawyer,” the author of the banking exposé, Other People’s 
Money,83 a noted progressive in both the Taft and Hughes Courts,84 
and the originator of Massachusetts’ affordable savings bank life in-
surance.  Brandeis had criticized oppressive provisions in insurance 
policies,85 and had described the insurance industry as “the greatest 
economic menace of today.”86 
It is also surprising that, in putting his shoulder to this unappeal-
ing wheel, Brandeis should have relied on the Due Process Clause.  
 
 79 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981). 
 80 It should be noted that, notwithstanding Dick’s defeat in the Supreme Court, there was a 
settlement thereafter.  Rensberger, supra note 66, at 68 n.220. 
 81 Cf. Weinberg, Theory Wars, supra note 65, at 1651 nn. 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 82 Note also the surprising authorship of N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376–77 
(1918) (McReynolds, J.) (reversing judgment for the insurance company in a case on 
facts similar to those in Dick).  Perhaps McReynolds’ authorship here was like Brandeis’s 
in Dick, a vote for or against Lochner.  McReynolds’ even more puzzling authorship of Mey-
er v. Nebraska is explored in Louise Weinberg, The McReynolds Mystery Solved, 89 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 137 (2011) (published 2012). 
 83 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1933). 
 84 I do not see as illiberal Brandeis’s participation in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 548–51 (1935) (striking down regulations under the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act as intrusive and unenforceable).  Unfortunately the Schechter Court also 
struck down a right to organize and a minimum wage.  Id.  Nevertheless it is possible to 
see the Act as corporate statism, influenced by fascism’s supposed domestic achievements 
in Germany. 
 85 See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, Wage Earners’ Life Insurance, COLLIER’S:  THE NAT’L WEEKLY, 
Sept. 15, 1906, at 16. 
 86 For discussion of Brandeis’s ideas, see generally supra note 59. 
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Brandeis was no fan of what we call “Lochnerism.”  He disliked sub-
stantive due process when deployed as a protection of economic 
rights.  Brandeis’s celebrated dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann87 
can be read as a dissent from Lochnerism.  There, he was urging that 
the states be allowed to serve as laboratories for experiment, on the 
very thinking that their regulatory efforts offend no substantive due 
process liberty. 
To be sure, Lochner had received a bit of a boost in the much-
admired early civil rights case, Meyer v. Nebraska,88 and Justice Brandeis 
had joined in Justice McReynolds’ opinion for the Meyer Court—
although Justice Holmes, significantly, had not.89  Meyer’s substantive 
due process holding, like Lochner’s, was about liberty.90  Brandeis 
would not have liked relying on Lochner’s “liberty of contract,” wheth-
er or not Lochner were mentioned by name.  Lochner had struck down 
a progressive labor law limiting the working hours of bakers.  The 
right to transact doubtless exists, but it does not compel the striking 
down of laws regulating the conditions of labor.  Brandeis himself 
had argued the landmark “Laundresses Case”91 in the Supreme 
Court, a working-hours case important to anti-Lochner developments 
of that time.  However, it does seem probable that, in Dick, the Justic-
es were assuming they would use the Due Process Clause to frustrate 
the state’s attempt to interfere with the obligation of contract, as the 
Court had done and would do again.92 
How, then, in view of all these contra-indications, can we explain 
Justice Brandeis’s authorship of Dick?  Is it just possible that Brandeis 
was using the occasion to change the conversation?93  In Dick, Brande-
is breathed new life into the Due Process Clause in one of due pro-
cess’s oldest functions—in protection of reason.  Law in courts must, 
above all, be reasonable, in its choice and application as well as its 
substance.  Just as law must not be arbitrary or irrational, so also it 
must not be applied in an arbitrary or irrational manner, and so also 
 
 87 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 88 262 U.S. 290 (1923). 
 89 Holmes’ dissent in Meyer, in which Justice Sutherland joined, is noted in Meyer, 285 U.S. at 
403, but appears in the companion case of Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1923). 
 90 For a darker view of Meyer suggested by McReynolds’ authorship of it, see Weinberg, The 
McReynolds Mystery, supra note 82. 
 91 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 415–16 (1908). 
 92 See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914) (after Lochner); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 593 (1897) (before Lochner). 
 93 Dick, 281 U.S. at 411 (“The garnishees contend that the . . . Texas law . . . violates the con-
tract clause.  Since we hold that the Texas statute, as construed and applied, violates the 
due process clause, we have no occasion to consider this contention.”). 
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it must not be chosen arbitrarily or irrationally.  State law, when ap-
plied, must be that of a relevant state.94 
True, even on the Court’s understanding of the facts, the named 
plaintiff in Dick was a Texan.  Justice Brandeis nevertheless ham-
mered home his own view of the case, insisting that despite Dick’s al-
legation of residence in Texas, Texas was irrelevant: 
[I]n the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or 
to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in 
Texas.  All acts relating to the making of the policy were done in Mexico.  
All in relation to the making of the contracts of re-insurance were done 
there or in New York.  And, likewise, all things in regard to performance 
were to be done outside of Texas.  Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas 
courts were invoked for any purpose, except by Dick in the bringing of 
this suit.  The fact that Dick’s permanent residence was in Texas is with-
out significance.  At all times here material, he was physically present and 
acting in Mexico.  Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the terms 
of contracts so made.95 
But what of public policy?  It was classic choice-of-law jurispru-
dence at the time, as we have seen, that a state could avoid an other-
wise applicable sister-state law if such a law was against the forum’s 
own public policy.  Public policy offered an escape from the yoke of 
rigid choice-of-law formulae.  In Dick, Brandeis acknowledged this ju-
risprudence.96  But application of the public policy, however admira-
ble, of an irrelevant state could not be due process. 
Brandeis put an accommodating gloss on the novelty of what he 
had done, seeming to embrace previous like cases, although previous 
like cases had been decided on theories that were unappealing to 
him.  He cloaked the doctrinal past with the general proposition that 
the Court had always been “agreed that a state is without power to 
impose either public or private obligations on contracts made outside 
of the state and not to be performed there.”97  But, in effect, Brandeis 
was using due process to transfer the requirement of reasonableness 
 
 94 I should mention the problem of the “unprovided” case, noted by Brainerd Currie, in 
which neither concerned state would have an interest in the application of its law.  See 
Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions:  Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 
10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958), in CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 65, at 128, 152–53.  
The classic “unprovided” case would be one in which the defendant’s home state would 
protect the plaintiff who did not reside there, and the plaintiff’s home state would shield 
the defendant who did not reside there.  In this situation Currie thought the law of the 
forum the only clearly constitutional choice.  Presumably he meant that the parties, at 
least, were before the court seeking judgment, the defendant was within its jurisdiction, 
and the forum has a residual justice-administering interest. 
 95 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1930). 
 96 Id. at 410. 
 97 Id. at 408 & n.5. 
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from the constitutional cases on extraterritorial adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion98 to the more fundamental problem of extraterritorial legislative 
jurisdiction. 
Prior to Dick, the inquiry had been wholly formulaic.  Under state 
law, the question had been, “Where is the place of contracting?  
Where is the place of performance?”  Under Supreme Court juris-
prudence, depending on how a case was argued, the inquiry had 
been, “Is the state law asserted extraterritorially?  Does it interfere 
with interstate commerce?  Does it impair the obligation of contract?  
Does it impair the traditional power of the place of contracting?”  To 
these inquiries, after Dick, courts would begin to add the question 
whether the law applied was that of a relevant state.99  As the Court was 
to put this fifty years later in the Hague case on due process in choice 
of law:  “[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitu-
tionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant con-
tact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, 
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally un-
fair.”100 
We are looking at the dawn of interest analysis in the intellectual 
history of the law of conflict of laws.  Dick is most usefully read today 
as Brainerd Currie, a founder of interest analysis, read it.101  This is al-
so the way Justice Brennan would read it in his due process opinion 
for the plurality in Hague.102  Today we read Dick for the proposition 
that a state without a legitimate governmental interest in governing cannot 
 
 98 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 99 Dick was more or less followed in a case on substantially similar facts.  Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 150 (1934), reh’g denied, 292 U.S. 
607 (1934).  But Delta & Pine superimposes upon Dick an obviously wrong and unworka-
ble plaintiff-disfavoring message that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.11 (1981) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (charac-
terizing Delta & Pine’s over-reading of Dick as denying a state power to favor its own 
resident plaintiffs, but explaining that Delta & Pine “has scant relevance for today”).  But 
see the astonishing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 426 (2003) (disingenuously 
citing Hague for its opposite in this regard, while holding, in aid of a floundering interna-
tional claims tribunal, that the thousands of Holocaust survivors living in California did 
not give the state sufficient interest to require disclosure of insurance benefits owing to 
them). 
100 Hague, 449 U.S. at 312–13; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 
(1985) (quoting and adopting the same language from Hague). 
101 Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:  Governmental Interests and the Judi-
cial Function, in CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 65, at 188, 211–14 (1963).  Currie’s 
assimilation of Dick to his own thinking no doubt has been a major factor in the case’s ce-
lebrity and its heightened significance in modern conflicts thinking. 
102 Hague, 449 U.S. at 313. 
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constitutionally govern.103  Dick holds, in effect, that, under the Due 
Process Clause, a state must have some meaningful connection with 
an issue before its courts can govern that issue.104  Some party, event, 
transaction, or thing must relate the case in a significant way to the 
state that is to govern.  Only significant connections can bring the 
matter to be governed within a state’s sphere of legitimate interest, 
and only further analysis can determine whether, even so, the state 
has a specific interest in having its law apply to the particular issue in 
the particular case on its particular facts. 
This was a stunning intellectual advance at that time.  If we are 
looking for Justice Brandeis’s reasons for the otherwise inexplicable 
Dick, they are here.  With the inconspicuous introduction of this 
thinking, so unobtrusive as to win the entire concurrence of the 
Lochner-era Supreme Court, it may not, perhaps, be too much of an 
overstatement to say that Justice Brandeis opened a path toward an 
understanding of the very powers of governance in a federal union. 
We have some support for this view in the fact that he seems to have 
brought the same understanding to bear in his opinion in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins.105 
The proposition that Dick embodies is a crucial one, not only in it-
self, but even more importantly, for its corollary.  For if a state with-
out a legitimate governmental interest may not govern, it would ap-
pear that a state with a legitimate governmental interest may. 
IV.  RUNNING WITH THE SALMON 
The 1935 Alaska Packers case106 was a commonplace dispute over 
workers’ compensation.  In that case, the Supreme Court held that a 
worker could collect California workers’ compensation for a work-
place injury suffered, not in California, but in Alaska.107  Yet as every 
lawyer at the time would aver, the law of the place of injury was sup-
posed to govern the tort.108  (We try not to think this way now, but the 
rule was universal then.)  California, however, was the place where 
 
103 See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 820 (holding in part that a state with insubstantial contacts 
with a case could not apply its own law to the rights of out-of-state class-members on leases 
of out-of-state gas fields (citing Dick)). 
104 The modern issue-by-issue approach to a choice of law, in preference to a single choice to 
govern a whole case, is sometimes referred to as dépeçage. 
105  304 U.S. 64 (1938).  See also infra Part V. 
106 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
107 Id. at 550. 
108 Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) (“The Law of 
the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.”). 
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the worker had been hired.  As every lawyer at the time would also 
aver, the law of the place of contracting was supposed to govern the 
contract.109  This latter characterization of the case as having to do 
with “contract” rather than “tort” was the characterization for which 
the worker argued, since he wanted California law, and this was the 
characterization the Supreme Court chose to adopt.110   
The problem of characterization was only one of multiple difficul-
ties the case presented.  In those days, in cases characterized as 
sounding in contract, there was an important alternative to the law of 
the place of contracting.  Courts sometimes saw fit to apply the law of 
the place of performance of a contract rather than the place of con-
tracting.111  And in this case, of course, Alaska, not California, was the 
place of performance. 
To add insult to workplace injury, the Alaska workers’ compensa-
tion statute purported to be the sole and exclusive remedy for work-
place injuries occurring in Alaska.112  The California employment 
contract itself stipulated governance by the law of Alaska.113  As every 
lawyer even today would aver, choice-of-law clauses in contracts are 
likely to be enforceable.114  On the other hand, California’s workers’ 
compensation code provided that “[n]o contract, rule or regulation 
shall exempt the employer from liability for the compensation fixed 
by this act.”115 
The employer raised four distinct arguments.116  First, the employ-
er argued, without much conviction, that California should simply 
defer.  Alaska was then a territory of the United States, and its com-
pensation law was, after all, an act of Congress.117  But the employer 
properly refrained from relying on the Supremacy Clause.  Alaska’s 
workers’ compensation law was domestic to Alaska Territory and was 
 
109 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). 
110 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 540–41 (“[W]here the contract is entered into within the state, 
even though it is to be performed elsewhere, its terms, its obligation and its sanctions are 
subject, in some measure to the legislative control of the state . . . the liability under 
workmen’s compensation acts is not for a tort.”). 
111 See, e.g., Swift v. Clay, 272 P. 170, 171 (Kan. 1928).  The rule is codified in the 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934). 
112 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 539. 
113 Id. at 538. 
114 Cf. U.C.C. § 2-101.  For a discussion, see, e.g., Haynsworth v. Lloyds of London, 121 F.3d 956, 
962 (5th Cir. 1997). 
115 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 538. 
116 Cf. Brief for Appellant at 5–8, Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (No. 465), 1935 WL 
32531, at *5–*8. 
117 Id. at *14. 
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not supreme “federal” law in any state.  In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice Stone ignored the argument altogether. 
Second, the employer pointed to the specter of double liability.  
Each of the two governments made its law exclusive.  In such circum-
stances, the employer argued, California should have given full faith 
and credit to the law of Alaska, the place of injury and the place of 
performance of the contract—if only to avoid double liability.118  This 
assertion was doubtful on its face.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
specifically refers to the acts, records, and proceedings of a state,119 
and, again, Alaska was not a state.  But Stone had bigger fish to fry vis-
à-vis full faith and credit.  For this purpose he was content to treat 
Alaska as if it were a state.  It is not too much to say that in Alaska Pack-
ers, Justice Stone wrote the Full Faith and Credit Clause out of the 
Constitution, and its implementing statute out of the U.S. Code,120 in-
sofar as the conflict of laws was concerned.  Although some lawyers 
have not understood this, full faith and credit is not given to laws, but 
is reserved exclusively for final judgments.  It was Alaska Packers that 
made this plain.  As Justice Stone explained, 
 A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without 
regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, 
wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in 
the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.121 
Third, the employer argued that due process required adherence 
to the stipulation for Alaska law in the agreement of the parties.  The 
employer did not cite Lochner,122 and Justice Stone did not mention 
the Lochner link between due process “liberty” and the obligation of 
contract.  As had Justice Brandeis in the Dick case, Stone saw the due 
process challenge as a claim of unreasonable deprivation of property. 
The greater importance of Alaska Packers lies in Stone’s thought 
processes.  In an early article on the conflict of laws,123 Paul Freund, 
who had clerked for Stone, and whose student I was, offered an intri-
guing observation about Stone’s Alaska Packers opinion.  Although 
Freund acknowledged that Alaska Packers was a constitutional case, it 
 
118 Id. at *6. 
119 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”). 
120  28 U.S.C. § 1738 ¶ 3 (“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so 
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”).  
121 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547. 
122 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 116. 
123 Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1946). 
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was “suggestive of an approach in conflicts cases generally.”124  True, 
Stone had troubled, for the occasion, to characterize workers’ com-
pensation cases as sounding in contract, and to reject a characteriza-
tion of tort.  Nevertheless, Freund pointed out that Stone had ulti-
mately dealt with the case “not in terms of a classification in 
workmen’s compensation cases as tort or contract . . . but in terms of 
the interests of the respective states.”125 
Freund went on, “From the point of view of due process, the facts 
disclosed clearly enough the interest of California in providing a leg-
islative remedy.”126  With this remark, Freund was implicitly basing the 
constitutionality of a governmental action upon the existence of a 
governmental interest in taking that action.  However, to us, Califor-
nia’s interests in the worker’s recovery may not seem as obvious as 
they had to Freund and Stone.  We are not told whether Alaska’s 
compensation law, had it been available to Palma, the employee, 
would have been less generous to him than California’s.  And Stone 
had to acknowledge that Palma was not a Californian.  Rather, he was 
a migrant foreign worker,127 hired for the salmon season.128   
Although California had no continuing interest in transitory 
workers like Palma, Stone pointed out that Palma might wind up re-
quiring public assistance in California.129  Thus California had an inter-
est in protecting its fisc and protecting California taxpayers from lia-
bilities which it was the California employer’s legal obligation to 
assume.  Furthermore, the employer was required to assume liability 
for compensation under the laws of both places—as to this, there was 
 
124 Id. at 1220. 
125 Id. at 1221. 
126 Id. 
127 The surname is used in Spanish, Catalan, Portuguese, and Southern Italian families.  Cf. 
Family Facts for:  Palma, ANCESTRY.COM, http://www.ancestry.com/facts/Palma-family-
history.ashx (last visited July 22, 2012). 
128  The terms of Palma’s employment, Justice Stone pointed out, required him to return to 
California to claim his wages.  Palma probably could not have found a way of claiming 
compensation from Alaska, as a practical matter, after his return to California.  Alaska 
Packers, 294 U.S. at 542 (“The probability is slight that injured workmen, once returned to 
California, would be able to retrace their steps to Alaska, and there successfully prosecute 
their claims for compensation.”); Freund, Chief Justice Stone, supra note 123, at 1221.  
Stone, or perhaps Freund, who may have written the draft opinion, apparently believed 
that, had some way been found for these fishermen to return to Alaska, the testimony of 
co-workers would have been required when they applied for compensation there.  See 
Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542 (“It was necessary for them to return to California in order 
to receive their full wages . . . accompanied by their fellow workers, who would normally 
be the witnesses required to establish the fact of injury and its nature.”).  I doubt this.  
Neither Stone nor Freund could have had practical familiarity with the workings of a 
workers’ compensation scheme. 
129 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542. 
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no conflict.  Stone thus explicitly found, foreshadowing his Carolene 
Products opinion, that it was sufficient for California governance that 
California had a “rational basis”130 for awarding compensation to Pal-
ma under California law.  The award therefore did not entail “any ar-
bitrary or unreasonable exercise of state power.”131  There was no of-
fense to the Due Process Clause. 
Stone might have added that California had a legitimate interest 
in shielding “its” employer, through its workers’ compensation 
scheme, from exposure to full damages in a jury trial in an action in 
tort.  Workers’ compensation is everywhere conditioned on waiver of, 
or statutory exclusion of, a remedy at common law.  It is this employ-
er-protective function of the workers’ compensation remedy that ex-
plains the “exclusive remedy” clauses typical of workers’ compensa-
tion statutes—the quid pro quo for the employer’s undertaking to 
pay the statutory benefits.  But one suspects that Stone would have 
felt uncomfortable with a selfish forum uniting its interest with that of 
its own citizen.  It is only reluctantly that scholars in the conflict of 
laws have come to accept the obvious:  that the primary intended 
beneficiaries of state law must be the state’s residents.  Indeed, a state 
has very limited power to regulate or protect anybody else. 
It is worth noting that the California court below, per curiam, had 
also used interest-analytic language, and had helpfully identified the 
chief interest on which Stone’s opinion would turn: 
[S]uch contracts as the present one, which hire itinerant labor in large 
groups to be transported out of the state for seasonal work and returned 
to this state at the end of the season, constitute a special class of employ-
ment contracts in which the state of hiring has an interest at least as sub-
stantial as that of the state in which the temporary and seasonal work is to 
be performed.  The laborer injured in the course of such employment is, 
by the terms of his contract of hire, to be returned to that state to be-
come a charge upon it if he cannot obtain compensation or take care of 
himself.132 
 
130 Id. at 543; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
131 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 543. 
132 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 34 P.2d 716, 722 (1934) (per 
curiam).  In addition, the California court had looked at the issue from the fisherman’s 
point of view, bringing to the foreground the practical difficulties of the worker’s situa-
tion.  Id. (“To leave the applicant to his remedy in Alaska in such a case would create a 
great hardship.  In this class of employment the employer exercises great control over the 
presence of the applicant in either jurisdiction.  Should he stay to prosecute his claim in 
the jurisdiction of the injury it is quite likely that he would lose his return transporta-
tion.”).  Apparently, even before the Chief Justiceship of Roger Traynor (1954–1970), the 
California Supreme Court had been a source of this sort of conflicts thinking.  For Tray-
nor’s contributions, see, for example, Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 910 (Cal. 1961) 
(Traynor, J.) (resolving what appeared to be a true conflict in the case at bar by narrowly 
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Winding up his opinion in Alaska Packers, Justice Stone consid-
ered, and rejected, the employer’s fourth and final argument, that 
Alaska’s governmental interests outweighed California’s.  With this, he 
proceeded to drive the employer’s position into the ground.  This was 
not a case of conflict at all, Stone rather surprisingly concluded.  In-
stead, it was what Currie would call a “false” conflict—a case in which, 
though the laws of the two states differ, there nevertheless is only one 
“interested” state.  California, Stone insisted, was the only state that 
had any interest at all in governing the compensation issue.  Alaska 
had no present interest in the case.  Alaska’s relation with Palma had 
been “severed.”133  This finding, that only one of the two concerned 
states had an interest in applying its law, probably explains the fortu-
nate absence from Alaska Packers of any balancing of interests, which 
Paul Freund otherwise characteristically would have preferred, imag-
ining that interstate “accommodation”134 would justify a departure 
from forum law. 
 Interest analysts today would argue that governmental interests, 
strictly speaking, should not be weighed.  The identification of a gov-
ernmental interest is sufficient to ground an application of the inter-
ested government’s law.  Although Paul Freund’s argument was to 
the contrary,135 the position today is that it is enough that the forum 
has an interest in—some rational basis for—choosing its own law.  In 
this case, Alaska was perfectly free to vindicate its governmental in-
terests—in its own courts.  But Alaska’s interests could not strip Cali-
fornia, also an interested state, of the power to apply its own law in its 
own courts:  As Stone put this, “[I]t is clear that [Alaska’s interests, if 
any,] do not lessen the interest of California in enforcing its compen-
sation act within the state, or give any added weight to the interest of 
Alaska in having its statute enforced in California.”136   
After Alaska Packers, nothing in the Constitution would require 
that the interested state’s power of governance be diminished in any 
 
interpreting the scope of the interest protected by forum law) and People v. One 1953 Ford 
Victoria, 311 P.2d 480, 482–83 (Cal. 1957) (implicitly comparing the governmental inter-
ests underlying conflicting laws to resolve a true conflict in favor of the state whose inter-
est would be more greatly impaired by application of the other state’s law).  Cf. Brainerd 
Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757–58 (1963) (prais-
ing “the moderate and restrained interpretation” pioneered by Justice Traynor in Bern-
krant); Brainerd Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719 
(1961). 
133  Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 549. 
134  Freund, Chief Justice Stone, supra note 123, at 1217. 
135 Id. 
136 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 550. 
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way by competing or even greater interests elsewhere.137  Governmen-
tal interests would not be “balanced” or “weighed.”  Ironically, Cali-
fornia’s courts would go on to develop the influential interest-
weighing technique of “comparative impairment.”138  But nothing in 
the Constitution requires the weighing of interests.  Brainerd Currie 
also counseled against the weighing of interests, arguing that forum 
law, in cases in which both concerned states were interested states, 
was the only clearly constitutional choice.139  Currie may have seen 
that departures from the law of the interested forum would be dis-
criminatory.140 
Stone would nail down the Court’s new interest-analytic thinking 
in 1939, in the Pacific Employers case.141  This was another worker’s 
compensation case involving a peripatetic worker, here a chemical 
engineer.  Hired at home in Massachusetts, the engineer was injured 
on the job in California.  Although both worker and employer were 
from Massachusetts, Stone again sustained California workers’ com-
pensation, explaining that any number of states might have a consti-
tutionally cognizable interest in applying its law—any number of 
states might have a rational basis for governing the compensation is-
sue.  As for Massachusetts, that state, as the joint domicile of the par-
ties and the place of contracting to boot, surely was free to apply its 
own law—in its own courts.  For the same reasons, California was free 
to apply Massachusetts law, if it so chose.  But California, as the place 
of injury, had legitimate interests of its own.  California had an inter-
est in affording compensation to the worker injured there.  True, Cal-
ifornia could have vindicated that interest under either state’s law.  
The California high court, perceiving this, had instead identified a 
more local interest—California’s interest in compensation for its 
 
137 For a concise statement of the modern view and of the role of the jurisprudence dis-
cussed here in its genesis, see the concluding remarks of Justice O’Connor in Franchise 
Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494–99 (2003). 
138 California early developed a way of resolving true conflicts, that is, cases in which both 
states are legitimately “interested” but the laws of which are in conflict.  In this situation 
of a true conflict, Currie saw no solution, and recommended forum law.  But under Cali-
fornia’s “comparative impairment” approach, the law applied is that of the state the in-
terests of which would be comparatively more impaired by failure to apply its law.  In this 
sense, California “weighs” the respective interests of the states in a case of true conflict.  
See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (1976); One Ford Victoria, 311 P. 2d 
at 480. 
139 CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 65, at 119. 
140 For the proposition that it is discriminatory for the interested forum to withhold its law, 
see Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991) and Louise Weinberg, On De-
parting from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1984). 
141 Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). 
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medical creditors.142  In the Supreme Court, Justice Stone again took 
his cue from California.  Were California to deny compensation to 
transitory persons injured there, physicians and hospitals might be 
forced “to go to another state,” Stone wrote, “to collect charges for 
medical care and treatment given to such persons.” 
When Stone was through with these cases, conflicts law, at least, 
would never be the same.143  Brandeis’s Home Insurance v. Dick and 
Stone’s Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers are the signal antecedents 
of modern conflicts analysis.  We now understand that a state may 
govern, not necessarily because a matter is within its general sphere 
of interest, but rather when it has a legitimate governmental interest 
in having its law apply to the particular issue on the particular facts—
a rational basis.  This is what due process requires.  It does not matter 
whether lawyers argue the case as a matter of full faith and credit or 
due process.  The interest analysis remains the same. 
Far more important even than this is the probability that these 
workaday cases, strangely enough, are the antecedents of modern 
constitutional thought. 
V.  ERIE AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
The momentousness of Justice Stone’s adoption of interest analy-
sis cannot be appreciated until grasped in its bearing on vertical 
(federal-state) conflicts as well as in its bearing on horizontal (inter-
state) conflicts.144  The news that presumptive government authority 
flows from governmental interest has had revolutionary force. 
 
142 Id. at 504 (“The Supreme Court of California has declared in its opinion in this case that 
it is the policy of the state, as expressed in its Constitution and Compensation Act, to ap-
ply its own provisions for compensation, and that [i]t would be obnoxious to that policy 
to deny persons who have been injured in this state the right to apply for compensation 
when to do so might require physicians and hospitals to go to another state to collect 
charges for medical care and treatment given to such persons.’”) (quoting Pac. Employ-
ers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 75 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1938)). 
143 Cf. Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts:  A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958), in CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 65, at 124 (setting out the 
interest analytic point of view, and crediting the Supreme Court with having developed 
it); see also Weinberg, Theory Wars, supra note 65, at 1635–36, 164 (2005) (discussing Jus-
tice Stone’s contributions to the twentieth century revolution in the conflict of laws). 
144 Cf. Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 1237 (2011); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:  “Actual” Conflicts, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 1743 (1992).  For an analogous position vis-à-vis the substance-or-procedure 
cases decided in the wake of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins and the simultaneous promulgation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938), see, for example, Joseph P. Bauer, The 
Erie Doctrine Revisited:  How A Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1235, 1266–70 (1999). 
320 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
Think of the then-misunderstandings of the commerce power.  
We are confident enough now that it cannot matter in the regulation 
of a national labor market whether goods have not yet entered the 
stream of commerce or have come to rest, or whether or not work is 
necessarily local—peace to the Court that decided Hammer v. Dagen-
hart.145  Think of the then-misunderstandings of federalism, the once 
de rigeur categories of a state’s “police power”—peace to Justice Peck-
ham in Lochner, fussing as he did over the question whether a ten-
hour day was about “health,” in which case it would be constitutional, 
or about “labor,” in which case it would not.146  Think about the faith, 
blooming even after the Thirties, in exclusive state governance of 
“primary activity”—peace to the second Justice Harlan147—and in the 
“interstitial” nature of federal law—peace to Henry Hart.148  Today we 
have the right questions to ask when struggling to identify “that which 
is truly local and that which is truly national”—peace to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.149  And peace to Chief Justice Roberts in the “Obamacare” 
case,150 insisting upon the Constitution’s “parchment barriers”151 to 
congressional action, and raising new barriers to the exercise of Con-
gress’s commerce and spending powers.152 
Before Carolene Products, the closest the Supreme Court had come 
to a workable understanding of government power was its gingerly 
recognition that a state legislature might have power to regulate 
those activities “affected with a public interest.”153  All activities may 
not be affected with a public interest, but all law is or should be.  We 
have come, or at least are coming, to see that even the search for 
 
145 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
146 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
147 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–75, 477 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
148 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 435 (1953) (“Federal law is generally interstitial in nature.”). 
149 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995). 
150 See generally Nat’l Federation of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (con-
sidering the limits of the several commerce, taxing, and spending powers of Congress and 
notably weakening the commerce and conditional spending powers). 
151 Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (Madison) (arguing the ineffectiveness of constitutional bar-
riers to the encroachment of one branch of government upon the others). 
152  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (“The individual mandate forces individuals into commerce 
precisely because they elected to refrain from commercial activity.  Such a law cannot be 
sustained under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.’”); id. at 2608 (“As 
for the Medicaid expansion, that portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the Constitu-
tion by threatening existing Medicaid funding.  Congress has no authority to order the 
States to regulate according to its instructions.”).   
153 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130–32 (1876). 
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“some limiting principle”154 is the wrong search.  There are no ab-
stract doctrinal boundaries to government authority.  Rather, gov-
ernment has presumptive power to govern.  And I believe the Su-
preme Court in the long run must return to this position, however 
contrary to Rehnquist Court jurisprudence155 and Roberts Court ju-
risprudence.156  There is—because there must be—presumptive au-
thority in the nation, and, subject to the Supremacy Clause, in the 
states as well, over any matter in which either respectively or both may 
have legitimate regulatory concerns.  There will always be hard cases, 
of course; but the presumption of power in the interested sovereign, 
when its governmental interests are understood, in best theory can be 
overcome only by the extrinsic limits imposed by the fundamental 
rights of individuals—and even these invaluable limits can be 
breached if the government’s interest is sufficiently compelling on 
the facts of the particular issue in the particular case.  The inquiry 
can be complex,157 but there is no substitute for it. 
To show some of the multiplex interworkings of federal and state 
powers with a simple homely example, take the question of the divi-
sion of assets upon divorce, a question generally assumed to be a mat-
ter of state law.  A state has legitimate interests in the peaceful and 
equitable settlement of disputes over assets in an action for divorce, 
whether the state allegedly is the marital domicile, or the residence of 
either party, or the place of prenuptial contracting for division of the 
assets, or the place where the assets are.158  But suppose that a veter-
 
154 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398) (Mar. 27, 2012), 2012 WL 1017220 (“JUSTICE 
KENNEDY:  . . . Can you identify for us some limits on the Commerce Clause?”); see also 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57 (“But even these modern-era precedents which have expanded 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to 
outer limits.”). 
155 Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–63 (holding in 1995 that Congress lacks commerce power to 
prohibit the possession of guns near schools); but see, e.g., United States v. Alderman, 565 
F.3d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 700 (2011) (relying on a pre-Lopez 
case that acknowledged, notwithstanding Lopez, Congress’s presumptive power to regulate 
possession of a firearm in interstate commerce).  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 
dissented from the denial of certiorari in Alderman, urging a grant of certiorari to reaffirm 
Lopez. 
156 See generally Nat’l Federation of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
157 See Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws, supra note 144 (analyzing cases). 
158 See Justice Brennan’s reminder in Hague that state interests grow out of contacts the state 
has with the issue to be governed, contacts with significance for the state in the particular 
instance.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–23 (1981) (“The lesson from Dick . 
. . , which found insufficient forum contacts to apply forum law, and from Alaska Packers, . 
. . which found adequate contacts to sustain the choice of forum law, is that for a State’s 
substantive  law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must 
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an’s benefits are among the assets sought to be divided.  Entitlement 
to veterans’ benefits would seem to be within the legitimate concerns 
of the nation, in the rough “jurisdiction-selecting”159 sense that we can 
perceive a general sphere of national interest. 
Presumably the United States provides veterans’ benefits to ad-
vance the recruitment and retention of military personnel.  National 
power to effectuate this governmental interest need not be implied; 
the provision and protection of veterans’ benefits is within the ex-
pressly enumerated power of Congress to raise and support armies.160  
But the question remains, under what law, federal or state, should 
veterans’ benefits be divided on divorce?  The state’s interest in pro-
tection of the resident dependent spouse is obvious.  But the national 
interest in providing for veterans is equally obvious. 
This was the question confronting the Court in McCarty v. 
McCarty.161  The Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, decided 
that Congress must have intended that veterans’ retirement pay be 
personal to the veteran, and therefore not subject to California’s 
community property laws.162  Justice Blackmun reasoned that veter-
ans’ retirement pay is important to the recruitment and retention of 
military personnel, and also provides current compensation for the 
risk of recall to service.  In addition, veterans’ retirement benefits fur-
ther the national interest in encouraging orderly promotion and re-
tirement in order to open senior military positions to youth. 
All this was true enough, as far as it went.  But under countervail-
ing pressure Congress stepped in to override McCarty, apparently in-
tending to deploy the same national power the McCarty Court had 
deployed.  The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act163 
quite properly avoids creating any spousal rights.  Instead, the Act re-
fers courts to state law to determine the division of a veteran’s bene-
fits upon divorce.  Congress might be said to have acted within its 
sphere of identified interest to raise and support armies.  Yet it would 
seem that the nation has no power to discourage the recruitment and 
retention of military personnel or to discourage retirement of older 
 
have a significant contact . . . , creating state interests, such that choice of its law is [not] 
arbitrary. . . .”).  
159 David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 173 (1933) 
(criticizing “jurisdiction-selecting” rules of choice of law on the ground that a sphere of 
interest is too general to ground a choice of law to govern a specific issue on specific 
facts). 
160 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
161 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
162 Id. at 223–24 (1981). 
163 Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act of 1982, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408.  
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military personnel.  Perhaps the security of the spouse, even unto di-
vorce, is part of the military’s recruitment and retention effort.  Per-
haps the national interest that more convincingly justifies the act of 
Congress is the general structural interest in preserving a measure of 
autonomy to the states in matters of domestic relations.164  Congress 
might be seen as exercising an implied power to preserve state-
created rights from the operation of federal supremacy when it is 
possible to accommodate such rights. 
In this example we can glimpse the complex interplay between 
national and state powers, and the sort of governmental interests (ra-
tional bases) from which these powers derive.  What is happily miss-
ing from the Supreme Court’s decision of the federal question in the 
McCartys’ case is a judge’s independent view of the best answer to a 
state-law question—the sort of independent judgment federal judges 
were once permitted to provide in state-law cases, in the absence of 
any national interest to justify the displacement of state law.165  We 
can readily see that to apply a federal judge’s ideas, however good, to 
a question that, properly considered, remains purely a state-law ques-
tion, is to displace the relevant judicial decisions of a relevant state for 
no reason.  That cannot be due process; and in this sense Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins might well have been decided under the Due Process 
Clause166—although of course it was not. 
This insistence on an authoritative lawgiver, of course, is the posi-
tivistic proposition that undergirds Erie.  As Justice Brandeis ex-
plained in Erie, quoting Justice Holmes, 
But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist with-
out some definite authority behind it.  The common law so far as it is en-
forced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common 
law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that 
State without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere 
else.167 
Nor can any government, however clearly specified, supply law on 
a given issue, if it lacks a legitimate governmental interest in doing so.  
 
164 For the argument that the national interest encompasses a vital interest in locally-
administered delivery of certain services, such as police protection and education, in view 
of the justified fear of a national alternative, see Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1295 (1997). 
165 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
166 For the extended argument, see Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance:  Due 
Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), draft available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125474.    
167 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 n.23 (1938) (citing Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 
215 U.S. 349, 370–72 (1910); Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928)). 
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If, in the McCartys’ case, the McCartys did not reside in California, if 
no agreement of theirs on the disposition of assets in the event of di-
vorce was made or to be performed in California, if the assets in dis-
pute were not located in California—in short if the McCartys’ case 
had no significant contact168 with California, California would lack any 
relevance to the problem of the division of Mr. McCarty’s retirement 
pay on the occasion of his divorce.  In such circumstances Califor-
nia—whether in its own courts or in the courts of any other state, 
would have no power to govern the division of the McCartys’ assets.  
The identified governing sovereign must be a relevant one.  That is 
the deeper message of Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie, as it is of his 
earlier less famous opinion in Dick.169 
Erie and Dick both hold that law without a relevant—“interested”—
lawgiver is unconstitutional.  It also becomes clear, after Erie, that 
American courts must choose.  Erie holds, in effect, that a choice of 
law—the identification of the sovereign source of governance—is 
constitutionally required.  No general rule will do.  The law chosen 
need not be that of the most relevant place, and need not be the law 
of the place of the most significant contact, or the place having the 
greatest interest.  It need only be the law of an interested sovereign.170 
It is no doubt accidental that Carolene Products and Erie were de-
cided on the same day.  But it is nevertheless the fact that a “rational 
basis”—the legitimate governmental interest of a relevant sovereign—
is what authorizes judge-made law under Erie, and what authorizes 
statutory law under Carolene Products.  Once you grasp the interest-
analytic metaphysics of Dick, Alaska Packers, and Erie, you can see Caro-
lene Products as part of this story.  You can also see it as an outcome 
and capstone of these unlikely beginnings. 
 
168 The phrase is taken from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1971), as it is used throughout. 
169  I am eliding the question of the power of Congress to incorporate the law of a potentially 
irrelevant state.  See, e.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (incorporat-
ing “the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”).  The Supreme Court at-
tempted to deal with this problem in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (holding 
that Congress intended to incorporate the whole law of the place of act or omission, in-
cluding its choice rules).  This approach is analogous to that of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec-
tric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (prescribing that when adjudicating issues of state law, 
federal courts must apply the law of the forum state, but must apply that state’s whole law, 
including its choice rules).  In either context the rule requires judges to make a good-
faith effort to divine what law the designated state’s courts “would” apply, according to 
the designated state’s own choice rules.  
170 See, e.g., the fact situation in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972).  
There, the plaintiff’s Canadian domicile would have barred relief and the defendant’s 
New York domicile would have permitted recovery. 
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VI.  GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS AND MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
Today the authority of governments to govern, the very idea of 
governance, seems to be under political assault by libertarians, the 
Tea Party, and cynical or naïve champions of deregulation.  But as a 
matter of constitutional theory, governmental power can be under-
stood in light of the forerunner cases we have been discussing.  The 
dawn of modern constitutional analysis cleared a path to new under-
standings, still not fully comprehended, of the sources, interworkings, 
and scope of the respective powers of nation and state.  We can see 
that government power arises in the presence of a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest within the rational sphere of interest of a relevant 
sovereign—whether that interest is an exigent need or simply some 
rational basis.  Any more formulaic doctrinal test at best will only ap-
proximate the needed analysis of governmental interest. 
At the time of the Gilded Age, the Article I powers of Congress on 
the one hand, and the “police powers” of the states on the other, had 
come in most cases to define the sources of American law.  Until the 
age of modernism, these powers were thought to be not only strin-
gently limited to enumerated lists as an original matter, but also—
and further circumscribing them—to be mutually exclusive.  Such 
thinking obscured the nature and sources of lawmaking power.  Pow-
er is not convincingly ascribable to some enumeration on a list.  (To 
be sure, the enumerations in the Constitution are the best evidence 
of the legitimacy of an asserted national interest; but where power is 
necessary but unenumerated it will be implied—and it was implied, 
and is implied, then as now.171) 
Following Carolene Products, governments, federal and state, would 
gain presumptive authority to act within their respective spheres of 
legitimate interest.  Today, government must show at a minimum a 
rational basis for the exercise of legislative or executive power, just as 
courts must show a rational basis for the choice of a sovereign lawgiv-
er to govern each issue in a case. 
With Carolene Products, we get deference to ordinary regulation—a 
long-awaited surrender to the views of the political branches.  And we 
 
171 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (implying na-
tional power over the foreign relations law of the United States from scattered “constitu-
tional underpinnings”); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1917) (in the ab-
sence of Article I enumeration, implying national power in Congress over admiralty cases 
from the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article III). 
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get a normalized administrative law.172  To be sure, today we have 
acute political problems that include influence peddling, chronic 
under-funding, agency capture, and the revolving door. But on the 
level of theory, the achievement of Carolene Products in the post-New 
Deal settlement remains a useful baseline for thinking about govern-
ance. 
With Carolene Products, the Roosevelt administration would no 
longer need to fear judicial review.  The regulatory efforts of state 
and federal legislatures and agencies were to be presumed constitu-
tional.  A submission to political will that had been deemed fatalistic 
and even reactionary in Justice Holmes173 was now seen as a triumph 
of progressivism.  Think about it.  It would be surprising if Justice 
Stone, the author of Carolene Products, had not experienced the ar-
rières-pensées discernible in his Footnote Four.  The New Dealers were 
eliding some big questions.  What about the rule of law in courts?  
What about Marbury v. Madison, and the preeminent province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is?174  What about 
the Bill of Rights?  Footnote Four was obviously an afterthought, but 
in the longer perspective turned out to be essential.  It was an ac-
knowledgment that a democracy, for all its insistence on majority 
rule, is best mediated by sound institutions under the rule of law.  A 
democracy is only as good as its protection of minorities and its re-
spect for fundamental rights.  Footnote Four was a recognition that 
without serious judicial review these requisites of good government 
might—would—languish. 
 
172 But see the appallingly deferential opinion in Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) (de-
ferring to the Social Security Administration's arbitrary use of state law, where state law 
disqualified posthumous children otherwise eligible for support, in a case in which the 
identity of the father was not an issue).  Discrimination against a class of children has 
been held a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in both Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  See the analogous case of 
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 350 U.S. 570 (1956) (referring to state law to determine whether an 
illegitimate child was a “child” eligible for copyright renewal rights).  In revising the copy-
right act, Congress created a definition of “child” which includes illegitimates, 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101, 304, overriding De Sylva on its facts, better conforming to the Equal Protection 
Clause, and better vindicating the national interest in promoting  “the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
173 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS:  THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. 
LASKI 1916–1935, at 248–49 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (“I have little doubt that the 
country likes [the Sherman Act] and I always say that if my fellow citizens want to go to 
Hell I will help them.”); see also FRANCIS BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT:  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE LECTURES 1960, at 9 (1961). 
174 For discussion of this general class of problems see, for example, CHARLES GROVE HAINES, 
THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 193–231 (1959). 
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So with Carolene Products and Footnote Four we reach one of the 
most significant outcomes of interest-analytic thinking—our currently 
prevailing regime of constitutional analysis, tiered scrutiny.  Impressed 
by the reservations Justice Stone spelled out in Footnote Four, our 
courts have afforded heightened scrutiny to inherently suspect classi-
fications and injuries to which the political process can be unrespon-
sive, and heightened protections for fundamental rights.  Courts re-
quire that government show more than a legitimate interest in cir-
circumscribing these rights.  In Footnote Four cases, the asserted 
governmental interests must be more than legitimate and rational; 
they must be compelling.175 
One perhaps troubling consequence of Carolene Products and the 
post-New Deal settlement is the discrimination they entail against 
economic rights.  At least when the economic rights in question are 
the personal rights of individuals and the small businesses they own, 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of economic rights is generating con-
siderable public concern.  Think of Astrue v. Capato,176 or Kelo v. City of 
New London,177 or Wilkie v. Robbins,178 or Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.179  The common 
law also traditionally has been reluctant to remedy certain kinds of 
 
175 Cf. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2731 (2011) (under the 
First Amendment, holding insufficiently compelling the state’s interest in protecting mi-
nors to justify the state’s regulation of minors’ access to sadistic video games). 
176 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) (reading the Social Security Act to require that the survivors’ bene-
fits of dependent in vitro children born posthumously of a known wage-earning father be 
determined by the vagaries of state intestacy law, notwithstanding that the children in the 
case met the qualifications set out in the statute authorizing survivors’ benefits).  See also 
discussion of De Sylva v. Ballentine, supra note 172. 
177 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that a city could authorize demolition of an old residential 
neighborhood not shown to be blighted, to the advantage of a private developer and 
large pharmaceutical company, on the speculation that development of a hotel and office 
complex there might increase revenue).  In Kelo, funding fell through, and the land has 
been turned into a dump. 
178 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (holding that years of harassing misconduct by federal government 
officials, with resulting damage to the plaintiff’s business, was not remediable in a civil 
rights action under Bivens v. Six Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971)). 
179 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2599 (2010) (holding that homeowners had no right to prevent interpo-
sition of a public beach between their ocean-front houses and the ocean, notwithstanding 
the resulting diminution in the value of their homes as private “waterfront” properties); 
id. at 2599 (explaining that the homeowners took title subject to the statute authorizing 
government renourishment of beaches eroded by hurricanes, and to the common-law 
rule that the government, having created the new land, took title to it in trust for the pub-
lic, so that the addition automatically became a public beach).  But the Court could have 
held that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause requires “just compensation” when the 
government lays open the private property of a homeowner to “public use,” in effect, in 
this way.  
328 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
economic loss.180  It may be time to rethink judicial approaches to 
these kinds of cases. 
ENVOI:  THRUST AND COUNTER-THRUST 
From unlikely beginnings in Supreme Court cases on choice of 
law, we can see emerging the sort of thinking that today informs the 
litigation of constitutional rights.  This sort of thinking also turns out 
to be useful in dealing with the complexities of federalism and the in-
trinsic limits of power. 
Late in the New Deal period, Erie held that the law applied in 
courts must be chosen—that the law applied in courts must be the law 
of some relevant sovereign.  Choosing the law of a relevant lawgiver 
inevitably leads to and informs an understanding of the wellsprings of 
lawmaking power.  But the choice-of-law question, unlike the power-
of-the-lawgiver question, is ideally presented “as applied,” while the 
question of authority is sometimes answered in a more abstract juris-
diction-selecting way,181 looking to a “sphere” of interest that purports 
to cover a whole class of cases.   
Such abstractions can cover too much ground.  A question wheth-
er a court should choose to apply a law the purpose of which is to 
protect enterprises from liability should not be answered without ref-
erence to the question whether the particular defendant enterprise 
in the case is conducting its enterprise in a way that is significant to 
the liability question within the state the law of which is sought to be 
applied.  The lawgiver cannot be chosen on abstract principles, but 
rather is identifiable as lawgiver only if its law is capable of rational 
application on the particular issue in the particular case on the par-
ticular facts.  Once this is understood, the several judicial functions of 
choosing law, determining the authority of the lawgiver, construing 
law, and applying law, can become disentangled and capable of the 
impress of thought.  But it is fair to say that a governmental interest is 
 
180 See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1928) (holding that the 
lessee of a vessel could not recover either in contract or tort against a dry dock company 
for economic loss resulting from delay in the lessee’s access to the vessel occasioned by 
the company’s negligent disrepair of the vessel’s propeller at the order of the shipowner).  
Robins, a case in admiralty, was governed by federal common law.  In the context of oil 
spills, Congress has removed federal common-law bars to recovery for economic loss in 
two statutes.  Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–61, § 2702(b); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–57, 
§ 2702(b)(2)(E).  
181 See generally Cavers, A Critique, supra note 159. 
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most convincingly identified within an acknowledged “sphere” of gov-
ernmental power. 
It is widely remarked that in our courts the tendency, gradually in-
tensifying over the past four decades, has been to erect barriers to en-
forcement of substantive law.182  From the point of view of the nation-
al interest, right-wing suspicion of regulatory governance might well 
be reconsidered.  A market seen to be well-regulated inspires confi-
dence in that market’s safety, integrity, and fairness.  Of course, over-
reaching, intrusive, or abusive regulation will trench upon rights 
which it is a core national interest to protect.  But civil society also 
rests in large part on the vindication in independent courts of legiti-
mate substantive governmental interests when sufficiently protective 
of those rights. 
The reader will recognize the thrust and counter-thrust acknowl-
edged here.  When are rights virtually absolute?  When is governmen-
tal interest sufficiently compelling to justify abridgment of individual 
rights?  The interest-analytic question is clearly a powerful question, 
often capable of yielding a conclusive answer.  When a forum’s gov-
ernmental interest can be identified it will yield forum power.  But 
the question will remain whether that power should be exercised.  In 
the end it must be admitted that governmental interest analysis, like 
earlier efforts to assist, direct, or cabin judicial discretion, can simply 
open to discretion a different question.  The hope is that the ques-
tion can escape unhelpful doctrine—that it is, in fact, a better ques-
tion, and that the existence of cases it does not purport to resolve will 
not impair its value. 
The difficulties encountered in attempting to raise and sort out 
questions of government power, concerns of federalism, and ques-
tions of right, through governmental interest analysis as through any 
other methodology, may be too great to yield better answers for us, 
despite the superiority of the method.  The answers in the end will 
seem too often to lie in the eye of the beholder.  In the Supreme 
Court, some federal questions are too politicized for us to expect to 
find persuasive answers to them through any methodology.  There 
will always be difficulty in disentangling reason from prior doctrine, 
and in the impossibility of providing balm to outrage on either side. 
 
182 See generally, e.g., WE DISSENT:  EIGHT CASES THAT SUBVERTED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS:   TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT (Michael Avery ed., 2009); H. Jeffer-
son Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational:  The Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional 
Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2011); Geoffrey R. Stone, Essay, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, 
and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1538 (2008). 
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This paper has tried to show simply that governmental interest 
analysis is a key legacy of the Hughes Court’s work in the field of con-
flict of laws, and that, surprisingly, this mode of analysis today 
grounds much of modern rights-based constitutional litigation.  Be-
yond this, this paper has tried to show that interest analysis can, and 
does—at the very least—shed light on the complex interworkings of 
American federalism, and can clarify the respective powers of state 
and nation (our mired politics aside) to govern for the common 
good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
